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Abstract:
Outsourcing has become a commonly accepted alternative of strategic management. But how do
stockholders rate the corporate decision to divest parts of the former business? We study the stock
market reaction of outsourcing announcements of the global financial services industry, using event
study methodology and multivariate cross-sectional regression analysis. We analyze a sample of 162
outsourcing transactions between 1997 and 2004 in order to investigate the drivers of excess returns
to shareholders of outsourcers and insourcers in the global financial services industry. The analysis
studies the impact of independent variables, the driving factors. Our findings indicate that many of
these factors have significant explanatory power, indicating that capital market’s reaction to an
outsourcing announcement might at least partly be forecasted. Partnering with experienced service
providers significantly benefits the outsourcer. Evidence indicates that insourcers significantly benefit
from large deals and transactions relating to traditional IT processes.
Keywords: Sourcing, Outsourcing, Insourcing, Global Financial Services Industry, Event Study
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SOURCING, RISK AND THE FINANCIAL MARKET

The examination of the outsourcing phenomenon, the process when a service provider takes ownership
of corporate resources and manages those resources on behalf of the outsourcer (Kern et al. 2002), is a
domain of the IS community for several years now. In recent times the questions "why to outsource"
and "what to outsource" have been succeeded by the question "how to outsource", i.e. how to make
best use of the opportunities enabled by the ability to use resources from outside the own company. An
integral part of the "how"-question is an assessment of the risks associated with conducting
outsourcing, multiple papers have been written on this issue and shed light on it from several different
perspectives. We aim to extend this knowledge by adding the component of a neutral referee, the
capital market. If publicly listed companies announce outsourcing deals, the capital markets react to
this announcement. The reaction can either be positive or negative, depending on the assumptions of
the investors regarding the impact on the business model of the outsourcing company and the bottom
line benefits resulting from the deal. As the upcoming regulation of the "Basel II" capital accord
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2004) requires banks to consequently measure their risks
and provide capital to cover potential losses resulting from operations, the banking sector is positioned
as a primary target for risk related research. As outsourcing naturally inherits a great deal of risk, the
capital markets are assumed to pay special attention to the anticipated risk in the outsourcing deal and
if it outweighs the potential chances (e.g. higher earning potentials), arising from outsourcing.
Outsourcing is not a risk free business (for an overview on the risks of outsourcing identified in
current IS literature see (Aubert et al. 1998; Quélin and Duhamel 2003)), nevertheless it is constantly
on top of the corporate agenda. Recently published market surveys unanimously report outsourcing to
be the bright spot in IT services for the years to come. Market research firm Gartner Group for

example estimates the worldwide market for IT outsourcing to grow from 160 to 230 billion USD
(from 2002 to 2007) and the market for business process outsourcing to expand even stronger from
110 to 175 billion USD in the same time frame (Caldwell and Young 2003). Also academics share this
view (Lancelotti et al. 2003; Lacity et al. 2004; Willcocks et al. 2004) and support the case of a market
which is large and growing (Lancellotti et al. 2003), still requiring more research.
The focus of this paper is on outsourcing activities of the global financial services industry. We chose
that sector for two reasons: (1) This industry is the second largest buyer of outsourcing services, just
after public bodies (Caldwell 2003). (2) The financial services industry has an immediate focus on
risk, as several national and international regulatory bodies have issued legislations that enforce banks
to re-think their risk management and incorporate operational risk, the risk of losses resulting from
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events (Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision 2004). This type of risk also applies to outsourcing.
We used event study methodology and multivariate cross-sectional regression analysis to capture the
reactions of the stock market, which is regarded as taking a neutral perspective, to analyze the
perceived level of risk, inherent in an outsourcing decision. The outsourcing announcement is actually
the first publicly available indication that two companies are engaging in sourcing arrangements.
According to market information efficiency (Fama 1970), investors will act upon this newly available
information and will adapt their stock trading strategies accordingly. We focus on a dedicated sector,
the financial services industry and we do not restrict our sample to IT outsourcing but assess the full
scope of strategic options also including application maintenance or business process outsourcing. By
conducting this research we aim to provide researchers as well as practitioners with valuable
information on how shareholders perceive the decision to engage in outsourcing projects and what the
key drivers for a positive or negative reaction of the capital markets are.
The paper is structured as follows: We provide an overview on the current state of research regarding
outsourcing and event studies in related fields. Thereafter we developed hypotheses grounded by
theoretical considerations and provide information on the methodology of our study. Finally we
display the results and close the paper with a discussion and conclusion.
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CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH

The impact of outsourcing on people, organizations and information systems has fascinated
researchers soon after the first outsourcing mega-deal (commonly regarded as being Kodak in 1989
(Hirschheim and Dibbern 2002)) has been initiated. IS research has adopted the outsourcing
phenomenon as an area of research interest since the last decade of the foregone century and its
attractiveness to the IS community remains unbroken (Dibbern et al. 2004). Outsourcing research
traditionally addresses three major questions: (1) why a corporation should employ outsourcing as a
strategic tool, (2) what to outsource and (3) how outsourcing should be conducted (e.g. contractual or
relationship matters)? The most current area of interest is the discussion of the possible implications of
outsourcing. Authors are increasingly investigating also the undesirable outcomes of outsourcing and
assess ways to avoid them. An early assessment of the risk of outsourcing has been conducted by (Earl
1996), further active contributor to the discussion on this field are (Aubert et al. 1998; Currie 1998;
Willcocks et al. 1999) from 1998 onwards investigating the risk factors to avoid when conducting
outsourcing engagements. A review of the literature conducted by (Quélin and Duhamel 2003)
revealed the main risks of outsourcing as identified in the relevant literature. They listed the
dependence on the supplier, hidden costs, loss of know-how, service provider's lack of necessary
capabilities and social risk as the topmost named risks. For this paper we exclude the assessment of
social risk which has been classified by Quélin and Duhamel as only regionally important in practice.
Several empirical studies have been conducted in comparable fields. In the following we highlight the
most important ones for our topic and give a brief abstract of their key findings. (Hunton et al. 2000)
analyzed a sample of 77 information systems IS outsourcing announcements between 1990 and 1997.

They found evidence that capital markets react positively on the announcements and abnormal returns
were greater for smaller firms than for larger firms (defined by the market value). (Gilley and Rasheed
2000) studied the effect of outsourcing of peripheral and near-core tasks on a firm’s financial and nonfinancial performance. They find no significant direct effect of outsourcing, but conclude that
outsourcing interacting with corporate strategy and environmental dynamism has an effect on firm
performance. (Glassman 2000) examined 27 companies which undertook large information
technology outsourcing initiatives between 1993 and 1999. Focus of this study was on IT mega deals.
The author found an average gain in shareholder value of 5.7 per cent over the general market trend
from two months prior to two months after the announcement (abnormal return). Glassman concluded
that outsourcing creates value to shareholders as outsourcing has become a management technique that
can reduce risk and increase flexibility by making costs variable. (Albright 2003) built on the study
provided by Glassman. The research timeframe has been extended to cover a data set of 45 deals from
1993 to 2002. Similar to the previous study, Albright concluded that outsourcing has a positive effect
on shareholder value. Additionally, he concluded that selective outsourcing is the superior strategy.
(Farag and Krishnan 2003) examined information technology outsourcing deal announcements
between January 1994 and August 2001. They concluded that capital markets react positively to IT
outsourcing announcements of IT industry firms and service industry firms. They find positive market
reactions to strategic sourcing projects, but not for cost-cutting projects. (Oh and Gallivan 2004)
analyzed a sample of 97 information technology outsourcing deal announcements between 1998 and
2001. Contrasting prior research, they find only weak evidence with respect to investors’ positive
reaction to IT outsourcing announcements. Specifically, they detect that abnormal returns are
negatively associated with asset specificity and with contract size. They found no evidence regarding a
significant association of abnormal returns and contract duration or between abnormal returns and
cost-reducing IT outsourcing announcements.
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HYPOTHESES

Our research approach aims to conjoin the risks of outsourcing as identified in IS-literature with
theoretical constructs adopted from agency theory. We assume that the capital market assesses both
considerations and thus derive the level of risk inherent to a specific transaction. Furthermore we
assume that an investor’s decision to invest or divest is to a large extent influenced by the level of risk
as perceived by the stockholders. Higher risk levels can be associated with potential divestments while
a lower level might lead to an increasing investment in the company.
Size of contract: The resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Cheon et al. 1995)
argues that companies exchange resources to reduce uncertainty and to increase their ability to
compete with other market participants. Outsourcing in order to secure external resources or
capabilities is a manifestation of resource dependency between client and vendor. The monetary size
of the contract is expected to play a significant role in determining the level of dependency (Oh and
Gallivan 2004). Thus, as contract volume increases, the outsourcer becomes more dependent on the
vendor. Additionally, monitoring costs and contract volume are positively correlated (Jensen and
Meckling 1976). We measure this source of risk by the deal size (agreed contract volume).
Hypothesis 1: Due to increased dependency, higher monitoring costs and general risks of large
projects, investors are expected to react negatively towards larger sourcing announcements.
Duration of contract: Considering the dynamism at which business processes and technologies
become outdated signing a long-term contract with a service provider may be risky. Not only business
uncertainty, but also technological uncertainty exacerbates the risk of long-term contracts, due to the
potential for technological discontinuities. The proposed duration of the contract plays a significant
role in many types of outsourcing arrangements (Oh and Gallivan 2004). Companies engaging into
long-term contractual arrangements face increased risks as they lose flexibility to react on future
developments (Willcocks and Lacity 1999; Lacity 2002; Young and Hood 2003). A worst case
scenario locks the client in to a poorly-performing vendor, constraining the client’s flexibility (Oh and

Gallivan 2004). In fast-changing market environments frequent strategic changes might be essential to
maintain a superior market position. In addition, being legally bound to a service provider prevents the
outsourcer from assessing newer technologies or business concepts and benefiting from superior
offerings and services already available in the market place.
Hypothesis 2: We expect investors to react negatively towards outsourcing contracts having a
long duration.
Deal complexity: Recently, the focus has shifted from characteristics of the ideal outsourcing contract
to the practicalities of actually making outsourcing relationships work. Researchers have developed
differentiations to describe various philosophies of managing outsourcing relationships. (Fitzgerald
and Willcocks 1994) propose two extremes as “simple transactional contracts” and “full partnershipbased relations”. Initially, many outsourcing arrangements implied total outsourcing to a single vendor
(Huber 1993; Venkatraman and Loh 1994). Today, however multi-vendor-deals receive wider
attention (Currie 1998; Gallivan and Oh 1999). This can be attributed to greater propensity of firms to
engage in selective or “smart” sourcing (Earl 1996; Lacity et al. 1996) or functional outsourcing
(Grover et al. 1996). Multi-vendor outsourcing arrangements are now a common part of the
outsourcing landscape (Gallivan and Oh 1999). As on one hand, the outsourcer might benefit from the
advantages mentioned above, on the other hand balancing out for the downsides is needed. In order to
measure the impact of the different deal constellations, we differentiate between simplistic one-to-one
relationships and multi-vendor arrangements and measure the capital market reaction to both
relationships. We measure this deal characteristic with a binary variable, “0” for deals including a
single vendor, “1” for deals employing more than one vendor.
Hypothesis 3: Outsourcers can reduce risks and increase their specific relationship power,
therefore we expect capital markets to approve of deals including multi-vendor relationships.
Experience of the service provider: Business experience is a relevant factor in leveraging economies
of scale (Bain 1954). An experienced insourcer that has performed a multitude of deals is in a better
position to leverage synergies and to benefit from economies of scale and scope. We thus expect that
capital markets reward higher returns to deals that have been announced by an experienced serviceprovider. Furthermore experienced vendors are assumed to have built in-house learning experience on
avoiding the pitfalls of outsourcing projects (Willcocks and Lacity 1999; Lassig et al. 2003). This is
expected to lead to a higher level of programmability (the ability to specify appropriate behaviour of
the vendor in advance) due to experience in contract negotiations and possibly from failed contract
clauses in the past. Also the risk that arises from a vendor pretending to have capabilities that in reality
are not present is mitigated as this behaviour would probably have been noticed before in the market
reducing the number of deals closed (Willcocks et al. 1999). Experience of the service provider is
measured by the cumulated number of previously acquired deals.
Hypothesis 4: Experienced service providers are in a better position to mitigate risks, therefore
capital markets react positively towards deal announcements including experienced vendors.
Transaction focus: Apart from cost considerations, outsourcing is also a strategic option for
companies to concentrate on their core competencies (Prahalad and Hamel 1990; Quinn and Hilmer
1994). The resource based view argues that a firm’s competitive advantage is build on skills and
resources that are provided internally (Barney 1991; Grant 1991; Cheon et al. 1995). In this view,
outsourcing of activities should be used as a temporary solution while companies build their own
internal capabilities (Dragonetti et al. 2001). While not directly addressing the outsourcing decision, it
is implied that outsourcing of non-core activities leads to saving resources (cash, time, staff,
technological resources, managerial attention) to be used in core activities (Bettis et al. 1992;
Dragonetti et al. 2001), ultimately leading to an enhanced competitive position (D'Aveni and
Ravenscraft 1994). On the other hand, several authors have noted that outsourcing of core activities
may lead to declining innovations (Kotabe 1990; Gilley and Rasheed 2000). We clustered business
functionalities in four functional types in order to differentiate between core and non-core activities:
IT-Infrastructure outsourcing (ITI), Application Development and Maintenance outsourcing (ADM),

Administrative Processes outsourcing (APO) and, finally, Business Process outsourcing (BPO).
(Friedrich and Gellrich 2004) have shown that outsourcing of ITI and ADM functions can be stated as
“non-core”, while “typical” core financial processes are covered in APO and BPO. For service
providers, traditional IT-related processes are scalable, flexible, homogeneous and usually
standardized. Ultimately this leads to less complex integration projects associated with lower levels of
risk.
Hypothesis 5: We expect sourcing of non-core activities such as ITI and ADM to be rewarded
by capital markets. We expect outsourcing announcements relating to core activities such as
APO or BPO not to be approved by capital markets.
Financial reliability of the service provider: A financially reliable vendor reduces the level of risk
as the probability for a default and therefore the threat to the customer of not being able to produce its
own services is reduced (Michell and Fitzgerald 1997; Lassig et al. 2003). A financially viable service
provider becomes increasingly less risk averse, it therefore becomes attractive to pass risk from the
customer to the vendor (Eisenhardt 1989), thus reducing the risk of the customer firm. Furthermore a
financially stable vendor is generally more likely to be a reliable partner for the future of the
engagement which reduces the risk of dependence on the service provider. As indicator for financial
reliability we used the Return-on-Equity (RoE) of the service provider. A high RoE indicates that a
company operates efficiently and profitable with its equity.
Hypothesis 6: Vendors providing a positive financial performance bear less risk, therefore
capital markets react positively towards deal announcements including service providers having
a high RoE.
An overview of analyzed factors and their interdependence with sourcing risk is provided in Figure 1.
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Research model of current study

METHODOLOGY, SAMPLE DESIGN AND DATA

Using event study methodology including OLS regression and the market model we analyze
outsourcing transactions announced by the financial services industry that have been publicly
announced between January 1997 and March 2004. The event study methodology applied in this paper
relies on the standard market model based approach suggested by (Fama et al. 1969), perpetuated by
(Brown and Warner 1980; Brown and Warner 1985; MacKinlay 1997) and used by (Beitel et al.
2004). As market indices we applied the MSCI World Banks, MSCI World Insurances and World
Financial Services Index, according to the industry classification of the outsourcer; for the vendors we
have used the S&P 500. We extracted all financial services by thorough research of outsourcing
literature. Additionally, we conducted a comprehensive investigation of global financial newspapers

included in LexisNexis using a variety of keywords such as “outsourcing in financial services”. This
way we derived a unique database of financial services outsourcing deals covering a timeframe from
January 1997 to March 2004 including a total of 272 deals in the global financial services industry
with a deal volume larger than 10 million USD. To verify and complement relevant fundamental
information for these 272 deals (e.g. event date, outsourcer, insourcer, type of deal, deal value) we
extracted and evaluated the official first press announcement regarding the signing of the specific
outsourcing contract. As the exact identification of the correct announcement date (i.e. event date in
terms of this study) is crucial to provide correct results for this analysis, we spent extensive and
comprehensive research regarding this issue. If we were unsure about the first press deal
announcement or if we found evidence of information trickling we eliminated the observation since it
is crucial for the event study to use the first date when the information reaches the market – otherwise
results would be erroneous. The majority of the press releases were published on the outsourcer’s and
insourcer’s investor relations websites. To complement this investigation we have also performed
checks for any pre-announcements and for other events that might have additional effects on the
specific company’s stock market performance (confounding effects). All financial services related
industry specifications (i.e. Banking, Insurance, and Other Financial Services) were based on the
specific Bloomberg classification. During the course of this study we will use this industry
classification to provide further analysis.
Of these 272 transactions no precise event date could be identified for 76 deals, for additional 14 deals
the involved companies are not publicly listed (e.g. smaller private banks) so that no relevant financial
data could be extracted. In order to account for outliers and to avoid a bias of the results we removed
20 outlying observations (sensoring). Thus, our final verified data set includes 162 outsourcing
transactions in the global financial services industry within the timeframe from January 1997 to March
2004 and each transaction being larger than 10 mio USD. For 104 deals we were able to verify the
fundamental information for both parties, i.e. outsourcer and insourcers. For 18 transactions, reliable
data could be retrieved for the outsourcer only, for 40 cases for the insourcer only.
These 162 transactions encompass 124 different financial services companies that have engaged into
outsourcing activities, termed outsourcers in the context of this study, and 59 observations for service
providers that have engaged into service providing activities, termed insourcers (or vendors) in the
context of this study. Service providers are, on average, more profitable than outsourcers (Return-onEquity of 16.91 per cent vs. 14.05 per cent) also they are seem to be more cost efficient (Cost-IncomeRatio of 63.08 per cent vs. 65.50 per cent). The average market-to-book-ratio (MTB) is 2.72 for
outsourcers and 4.83 for service providers, while the average price-earnings ratio is 15.76 per cent and
24.42 per cent, respectively (all data provided by Bankscope and Datastream). As outsourcers stem
from the financial services industry and the vast majority of insourcers stems from the service
providing industry, the different performance figures need careful interpretation.
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ANALYZED VARIABLES

The absolute size of the outsourcing transaction is measured by the variable “deal size”. The contract
value was available for 97 transactions. The average contract value is 595.27 million USD. The
maximum value is 5bn USD, minimum value is 10 million USD. For outsourcers, the size of the
contract reflects the amount of operational costs now sourced externally. For insourcers, the value
reflects an additional revenue stream. The deal length of the transaction is measured by the variable
“deal length”. The average deal length of transactions in our sample is available for 110 transactions,
the mean is 7.51 years. Some outsourcing deals encompass more than one vendor (additional
vendor). We find nine deals in our data sample containing more than one vendor. The sourcing
business experience of an insourcer is measured by the total number of insourcing deals by a
specific service provider. On average, insourcers in the sample have performed 13.8 insourcing
transactions. We differentiate four different functional areas of financial institution’s outsourcing. 56
deals are in the area of BPO, 5 in APO, 33 in ADM and 66 deals are in ITI (2 deals could not be

categorized due to missing information). Return-on-Equity for the outsourcers is on average 14.40
per cent, for the insourcers 16.40 per cent. As control variables we introduce several additional
variables, i.e. the market capitalization of the sourcing partners, the ratio of the absolute deal size
in relation to the market capitalization, the industry sector of the outsourcer as well as the year of
the transaction. Table 2 provides an overview on the independent and control variables.
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RESULTS

6.1

Event study results

Cumulative abnormal returns for outsourcers and insourcers are presented in Table 1 in the appendix.
Shareholders earn, on average, slightly negative (but mainly no significant) returns in most of the
analyzed event windows. For the outsourcers we detect negative CARs in all analyzed event windows.
For the event window [-1;1] we detect a significant negative CAR of -0.68 per cent. For the
insourcers, we detect negative CARs in eight of the analyzed twelve event windows. The event
window [-3;3] displays a significant positive CAR of 0.86 per cent. On a first glance, these results
differ from previous related findings which mainly report positive cumulated abnormal returns. But
readers should keep in mind that we focus on one industry (the financial services sector) and included
not only IT-related sourcing announcements. Thus, our results are not really comparable to results
from other studies focusing on various industries or cover only IT outsourcing (Glassman 2000;
Hunton et al. 2000; Albright 2003). The following section provides results of the cross-sectional
multivariate regression for outsourcers and service providers.
6.2

Regression results

Cumulated abnormal returns are analyzed separately for clients and service providers. Table 3
provides an overview of the results for the total model. They have been generated using crosssectional multivariate OLS regression analysis. Relevant event windows have been taken according to
significant results in the event study. Adjusted R2 are 0.23 and 0.33, for outsourcers and service
providers, respectively. F-values are highly significant at 1.87 and 2.24. Figure 2 provides a detailed
overview of the results relating to the hypotheses specified above.
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Financial performance of service provider

Figure 2:

* / ** / ***: indicates significance at 10 / 5 / 1 per cent level

Overview: OLS-regression results

Hypothesis 1 suggests that investors do not approve of large deals since they provide more potential
for sourcing risks. Our results do not provide consistent support for the hypothesis. Outsourcers

significantly benefit from large deals (positive coefficient at the 10 per cent level). Service providers,
on the other hand, receive significant negative returns when engaging in large transactions. Obviously,
at least for the outsourcers, investors seem to evaluate other factors positively associated with deal size
and potentially outweighing the risks attributed with large deal volumes. As large deals provide more
potential to leverage synergies they can create cost advantages a fact which also benefits the
outsourcer. According to Hypothesis 2 we expected long deals to bear increased risks. For the
outsourcers our analysis yields a significant negative coefficient. For outsourcers, investors do not
approve of long deals. This finding supports our expectations. Though longer deals provide a stable
structure for strategic business planning, the downsides (e.g. inability to source operations back in,
strategic inflexibility and being locked in to service providers offering outdated technology) outweigh
potential upsides. In Hypothesis 3 we formulated the expectation that deals including an additional
vendor or sub-contractor provide potential for increased risks. Our results do not provide grounds to
support this hypothesis. Outsourcers including an additional vendor into the transaction significantly
benefit from this constellation. We find a positive and highly significant coefficient. Outsourcers that
engage into multi-vendor relationships increase their specific relationship power and decrease their
individual dependency risk. According to Hypothesis 4 we expected capital markets to react
positively towards deal announcements including experienced service providers. Our results
significantly support that hypothesis. Clients engaging in partnerships with experienced service
providers are significantly rewarded by capital markets. Experience, counted as number of past deals,
can be viewed as an appropriate proxy for risk-reducing qualities and abilities. For the service
providers, our results are counter-intuitive, as the coefficient is significant, but negative. If a serviceprovider has already closed a multitude of transactions investors might fear that an additional deal
creates too much pressure on the already stretched organization. Hypothesis 5 suggests that sourcing
of traditional IT-related services provide less risk potential. Our results show that service providers
engaging in traditional IT-transactions (ITI, ADM) are significantly rewarded by investors. Provision
of scalable, standardized homogeneous services which are less complex to integrate compared to
typical finance processes is highly rewarded by investors on capital markets. In Hypothesis 6 we
formulated that financially successful service providers account for less risk. Our empirical findings
do not provide significant support for this hypothesis. Relating to another financial performance
figure, our results suggest that service providers significantly benefit from transactions including
clients that display a large cost-income-ratio. Sourcing in currently cost intensive operations is
rewarded by investors as these operations provide a potential to harvest synergies and cost-reductions.
6.3

Limitations of the study

The premise of this study was, as for all event studies, that outsourcing is attributed with certain risks
for the involved companies and that announcements provide information about future cash flows and
have the potential to impact a company’s market value. Although a comprehensive attempt was made
to control for confounding variables, all potentially confounding variables may not be considered in
this study. For example, future studies could control for characteristics of risk sharing, incentives and
penalties defined in the contract between the sourcing partners. Similarly, controlling for sourcing
activities of the specific financial services company thus gaining a measure for the firm’s vertical
integration and sourcing experience might be useful in future studies. For service providers market
structures and environmental dynamism can be a fruitful area of further research. Generally, it can be
stated that finding the “right” variables and providing appropriate concepts to operationalize the
assumptions and hypotheses is a challenge in itself. We suggest this area as a topic for further
academic research. The same holds true for measuring risk inherent to sourcing contracts. Although
we measured risk with a variety of variables we were unable to provide any evidence that capital
markets react adversely towards certain deal attributes. Again, this can be due either to employing
incorrect variables or that capital markets are missing a comprehensive understanding of the risks
inherent in outsourcing (or at least investors believe that potential upsides of sourcing arrangements
outweigh potential downsides and risks).
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CONCLUSION

The results of the study did not in every case match up with our expectations. Three insights are of
special interest:
(1) Partnering with experienced service providers significantly benefits the outsourcer. This implies
that the stock markets react in a conservative way if it comes to large and risky projects such as
outsourcing engagements. Senior management in charge of outsourcing decisions should bear this
finding in mind when selecting the service provider. Capital markets perceive less risk when the
insourcer is experienced.
(2) Service providers significantly benefit from large deals. Although that insight may not come as a
surprise it may well be useful for vendors and their pricing department. Therefore this knowledge may
also benefit the outsourcer during contract negotiations. Though one might argue that large deals bear
high potentials for operational risk for the vendor, they also provide increased potential to leverage
synergies and uncover economies of scale. Obviously, these upsides outweigh risky downsides.
(3) Service providers significantly benefit from deals relating to traditional IT processes. Once again
the capital markets position themselves as conservative. This is interesting as the market for ITI is
nowadays rather competitive thus resulting in diminishing margins. More and more service providers
try to locate other areas for profit generation which are still not dominated by a multitude of capable
vendors. One focus of interest is APO and BPO where numerous service providers are currently
undertaking steps to enter these markets. It is noteworthy that the capital markets actually do not value
these shift in vendor strategy.
In conclusion our study provides beneficial ideas to academics as well as practitioners. Further
insights are needed in order to understand complex sourcing relationships in the light of the influential
factor of risk. Practitioners gain useful insights in order to maximize market impact (thus shareholder
value) of their sourcing thus corporate strategies.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the E-FinanceLab, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.
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APPENDIX

Table 1: Event study results. Abnormal returns have been calculated using OLS-regression. OLSparameters have been estimated for a period of 252 trading days (1 trading year)
***/**/* indicate significance at the 1/5/10 percent level.

Table 2:

Table 3:

Independent and control variables.

Total model: OLS-regression results for the cumulated abnormal returns of outsourcers
and service providers. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1/5/10 per cent level.

